The game is based on the planned German invasion of England in WWII, the original orders of battles, actual logistics. All are welcome to take part in this game.
The initial German briefing is below.
The
Fuhrer and CINC of
the Wehrmacht Fuhrer
HQ, 16 July 1940
OKW/WFA/L #33 160/4O g. Kdos.
DIRECTIVE No. 16
Concerning preparations
for an amphibious operation
against England.
Since
Britain still shows no sign of willingness to come to an
agreement in spite of her hopeless
military situation, I have decided to prepare and if necessary carry out an amphibious operation against
England.
The purpose of this operation
will be to eliminate the English
mother country as a base for continuation of the war
against Germany and, if it should become necessary,
to occupy the entire island.
To this end I order
as follows:
1. The amphibious
operation must be carried
out as a surprise crossing
on a broad front
extending approximately from Ramsgate to the
region of the Isle of Wight, with Luftwaffe elements assuming the role of
artillery, and naval units
assuming the role of engineers.
Each individual branch
of the Wehrmacht will examine from its own viewpoint
whether it appears
practicable to carry out subsidiary
operations, for example to
occupy the Isle of Wight or Cornwall County,
prior to the general crossing, and will report its findings
to me. I reserve the decision to myself.
Preparations for the overall
operations must be completed
by mid-August.
2.
These
preparations will include
the creation of conditions
which will make a landing
in England possible:
a. The
British air force must be so
far neutralized, both actually
and in morale, that it will offer
no appreciable resistance
to the German crossing
operation;
b. Lanes must be cleared
of mines;
c. Both outlets of the Straits
of Dover, and the west entrance to the English Channel in a line approximately from Alderney to Portland, must be
sealed off by a dense belt of mines;
d. The
coastal areas must be commanded and covered by
the fire of heavy coastal artillery;
e. It
is desirable that all
British naval forces
should be tied down
in action, both in the
North Sea and in the Mediterranean—here
by the Italians—shortly
before the crossing; efforts
must be made now already by means
of air and torpedo attacks
to weaken as far as possible
the British naval forces presently in
those waters.
3. Organization
of Command and Preparations.
Under my command and
in accordance with my general
directives the commanders
in chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht will direct the operations
of their forces employed in
the operation.
From
1 August on, the operations staffs of the commanders in
chief of the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe
must be within the area with a maximum radius of 30 miles from my headquarters at Ziegenberg.
To
me it appears
advisable for the most vital elements
of the operations staffs of the
commanders in chief of the Army
and the Navy to
occupy mutual
premises in Giessen.
The commander in chief of the Army
will thus have to establish an army group headquarters
to conduct the
operations of the landing
armies.
The operation will be given the designation
Sea Lion. During preparations and in the execution of the operation the
missions of the three
branches of the Wehrmacht will
be as follows:
a. Army. Preparation of plans of operations
and of a crossing plan
initially for all units to be
shipped in the
first wave. The units accompanying
the first wave will remain under Army control (under the individual landing groupments) until it is possible to subdivide their mission into responsibility
for (1) support and protection
for the ground forces, (2) protection
of the ports of debarkation,
and (3) protection for the
air bases to be occupied.
The Army will also allocate shipping
space to the individual
landing groupments and will define the points of embarkation and
debarkation in agreement with the Navy.
b. Navy.
Procurement and assembly of the required shipping space at the points of embarkation designated
by the Army and in accordance with
nautical requirements. As far
as possible use will be made of ships from
defeated hostile countries.
The necessary naval
advisory staff,
escort ships, and
other protective naval units
will be provided by
the Navy at each crossing area.
In addition to the protection afforded
by the air units employed, naval forces will protect the flanks
of the entire movement across
the Channel. Orders will be
issued regulating the chain of command
during the actual
crossing.
Another
mission of the Navy is to direct the uniform disposition of coastal
artillery, namely, of all
naval and Army
batteries which can be used against naval targets and to generally organize the control of fire.
The largest possible
number of the heaviest artillery
units will be so placed that they
can be brought into effective action
as speedily as possible to protect the
flanks of the movements against hostile naval attack. For this purpose all railway artillery,
reinforced by all available captured guns but minus the K-5 and K-12 batteries
earmarked for counterbattery fire against shore-based hostile artillery in England, will be withdrawn from present positions and emplaced on railway turntable
mounts.
In addition
to the above, all platform
guns of the heaviest
types will be so emplaced under
concrete protection
opposite the Straits
of Dover that they will be proof
against even the heaviest air attacks. They will be so sited that they will command the
Straits under all circumstances as far as their ranges permit.
The technical work involved
will be carried out by Organization
Todt.
c. Luftwaffe. The mission of the Luftwaffe will be to prevent interference by hostile
air forces. In addition airpower
will be employed to neutralize coastal
fortifications which could deliver fire in the landing
areas, to break the initial resistance offered
by the hostile ground forces, and to destroy reserves
during their forward movement. These missions will require extremely
close contact between the individual air units
and the landing forces of the Army.
It
will also be important for air units
to destroy roads which could be used by the enemy
to move reserves forward, and to attack naval units approaching the areas of
operations while still far distant
from the crossing routes.
I request recommendations
on the use of paratrooper
and glider and other airborne
forces. The question must
be examined together
with the Army whether
it would be wise
to withhold paratrooper and other airborne
forces during the initial stages as a reserve force which could
be moved quickly
to critical areas in the
event of an emergency.
4. The Wehrmacht
chief signal officer will ensure
that all necessary preparations
are made to establish
communications between
France and England.
Preparations will be made in
cooperation with the Navy to lay what is still available
of the 48 miles of marine cable taken up
from the East Prussian canal.
5. I request the commanders in chief
to submit to me as early as possible:
a. The measures planned
by the Navy and the Luftwaffe
to create the conditions
necessary for the
Channel crossing
operation (Item 2, above);
b. Details on the
disposition of the coastal
artillery batteries (Navy);
c. A survey of the shipping
to be employed and of the methods of concentration
and equipment. All civilian agencies participate? (Navy);
d. Plans for the organization
of air defense in the
areas of concentration for troops and
for equipment to be used in the crossing
operation (Luftwaffe);
e. Channel-crossing
schedule and plan
of operations of the Army,
and organization and
equipment of the first attack wave;
f. Organization
and action planned by the Navy and the Luftwaffe for the defense
of the crossing movement
itself, for reconnaissance, and for
support during the landing;
g. Recommendations
concerning
the commitment of paratrooper and
other airborne forces and concerning
the command of forces after an adequately
large area has been brought under control
in England (Luftwaffe);
h. Recommendations
for the location of headquarters
for the command echelons
of the commander in chief of the Army
and the commander in chief of the
Navy;
i. Comments
by the Army, the Navy,
and the Luftwaffe
as to whether and what partial operations
are considered
practicable prior to the general
amphibious operation;
k. Recommendations by,
the Army and the Navy concerning
the chain of command during the crossing, while seaborne.
S/ Adolf Hitler
