Ukraine 2023: Fort Leavenworth’s Tactical Game of the Ukraine War

 

Having played the game a number of times with various audiences, I would say it demonstrated hobby wargamers were routinely better than military professionals in terms of tactics at the company level battle.

The rules were written at Fort Leavenworth, one of the homes of the American Army. First written in 2020 for a US v Russian battle in eastern Europe, the hit probabilities were considerably edited in the light of watching lots of YouTube videos about the actual Ukraine War in 2022. Russian units were downgraded considerably in the light of actual war.

The rules were for a 6mm scale Russian coy in a hasty attack against a standard Ukrainian ad hoc platoon in a hasty defensive position. The game system is ‘you go, I go’ turn sequence, but with overwatch fire. Roll to hit, roll to save in cover. The key innovation, apart from using actual combat data, was if either side moved off its plan, they pause and roll a dice to see if they can change the plan. If not, they just roll again next turn. This means good pre-game orders are crucial and sometimes the battle just stops as the Russians encounter an unexpected obstacle. The Russian advances stops for a random amount of time as the commanders consult and make a new plan. All very realistic.

The Russian company had 10 BMPs, 4 tanks, a ZSU, a truck with military police and another with a section of engineers. The Russian method of organising everything into battalion tactical groups means every sub formation has a bit of the support troops. NATO trained armies just allocate support as needed. Although the Russians had practically unlimited fire support, it had to be all pre-planned like something out of WWI.

The first problem was the professional wargamers largely did not know what the Russian tactics from the Cold War actually were. They have focussed on real world COIN for 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, so were a bit perplexed. The second problem was the professional wargamers largely did not know how to manage an ad-hoc Ukrainian platoon, so were unclear what to do with just 2 tanks, 2 BMPs, 1 dismounted saggar, some infantry, a couple of trucks plus some random obstacles (trees cut down). They had no drones, no mines, no wire, and artillery support availability was random depending on mobile phone reception. Hobby wargamers are quite used to operating with whatever toys come out of the box and improvise.

The result of the battle was the same in every game. The Russians took lots of casualties, but advanced 5 km over 2 to 3 hours, and the Ukrainians lost stuff during the fighting withdrawal. Most wargamers are too aggressive running a fighting retreat; in real war, a fighting retreat consists of a few ambushes, then a hasty withdrawal to the next position. Keeping the unit in being is a critical part of the defensive mission. 

The actual war has demonstrated that analysts underestimated the importance of morale. Tank combat is using a crew served weapon system. To win the battle requires a tank to position itself in harms way, observe, locate the enemy, prioritise, aim and fire. The longer a tank takes to do this the more chance it stands of getting a first-round kill, but the downside is the longer a tank takes to do this, the more chance of the enemy getting the first shot in. After firing, it takes a few moments after the dust, shock, flash and smoke to re-aim and fire a 2^nd and subsequent rounds. Staying put and firing again increases the chances of obtaining a kill, but firing increases the chance of the enemy identifying you as an active threat and sending a missile towards you. Therefore, effective tank combat requires high morale for the crew to put themselves at risk in order to kill the enemy. Ukrainians tanks in these rules fire twice as often as Russian tanks, as the Ukrainians were more willing to take risks to fire effectively.

I commenced by saying hobby wargamers were better than military professionals at tactics, but this does not mean one could drop a hobby wargamer into commanding a troop of tanks in combat. Leadership in war is not just about tactics, but includes leadership, morale in the face of death, actually making the tank move and shoot, etc. Tactics are only a part of the professional warrior’s job description. However, based on the sample of people who have played my modern wargames over several decades, it suggests that professional warriors need to spend more time on the tactics of warfighting. This includes a deep understanding of how the Russians currently fight. Of course, how you fit that into the new British Army’s social calendar and ethos is an interesting topic of conversation.

Confrontation Analysis and the Ukraine War

Confrontation Analysis is a method of analysing and gaming situations involving multiple stakeholders with competing aims and objectives. It has been used professionally by various organisations interested in modelling the options for all sides and obtaining clarity on who wants what to happen. The result is often a series of dilemmas and the method presents suggestions on how each type of dilemma can be potentially solved.

The method is documented in Curry J. and Young M. (2017) The Confrontation Analysis Handbook: How to Resolve Confrontations by Eliminating Dilemmas: Innovations in Wargaming Volume 3.

At the start of the Russian invasion I used the method to identify and analyse the strategic options available to each side. Imagine each side has cards (options) in their hand. Each card states what it does and summaries the other stake holder’s position on the card (i.e. they want it to happen, the don’t want it to happen, or they do not care). Cards can be held secretly in a player’s hands, put on the edge of the table as a threat (i.e. I will play this card if you do something I do not like) or be played (i.e. actioned). The method allowed me to largely model the strategic options that have since come into ‘play’ during the subsequent war. I wish I had documented these efforts to an academic standard at the time.

For example, Russia plays “Threaten Norwegian gas and oil installations” (they did this with drones and close target recces). NATO plays “Mobilise Norwegian military” card, and “Deploy Royal Marines and Royal Navy” cards to counter the Russian threat. Russia then has a belief dilemma, as NATO does not believe that Russia could cripple Norwegian production.

Another example is Russia plays “Threaten grain shipments by sea from Ukraine”. NATO plays “Deploy Turkish Navy to protect merchant shipping”. Again, Russia has a belief dilemma, as Turkey thinks it would sink Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet with just three of its ships.

Nuclear weapons first use by Russia is an example of a threat card that is on the card table. Russia could do it (i.e. it has the delivery means), but just having the card as a threat does not commit Russia to use or non-use.

The USA also has many threat cards, largely centred around delivering weapons to Ukraine e.g. Training Ukraine pilots on F15/F16’s. Having trained pilots and ground staff just waiting for the aircraft to be delivered to Ukrainian airfields is a powerful threat card.

Having revisited Confrontation Analyse and used it for the Ukraine War, I am very impressed the way it helps encourage identifying strategic options available to all sides. As the cards are played onto the card table it dynamically inspires the creation of further cards (options). Unlike game theory that assumes a static state, Confrontation Analysis assumes the playing area changes as cards are played and discarded.

The card which most surprised me was created during the game, it was called “if you think your oil and gas industry will be working in the morning…” The card was generated by NATO and the aim was to shut down the Russian energy industry for the immediate future. It inspired an interesting discussion about the feasibility of cyber, special forces, hitting critical transport nodes(pipelines) etc. the only card the Russians could play to counter that particular threat was “go nuclear”. This was disturbing card to say the least to see on the card table at the end of the session.